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Introduction
THE HOMELESS ARE ESSENTIALLY UNPROTECTED from gov-
ernment surveillance.1 When the government suspects a person of a
crime, it may open an investigation and employ surveillance tech-
niques in order to collect evidence. The home is a constitutionally
protected area into which government surveillance cannot legally in-
trude without the judicial scrutiny of a warrant or an authorized ex-
ception.2 Without the protection of a home, a person’s daily life and
property must, by definition, be out in public, and thus not private.3
This has been the prevailing logic in government surveillance juris-
prudence for decades and has protected those with houses and money
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1. See, e.g., United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1472–73 (10th Cir. 1986) (find-
ing that a homeless man did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a cave on
government land where he lived); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 613 n.2 (Ct.
App. 1995) (finding no privacy expectation in cardboard box located on city sidewalk in
which homeless defendant was residing); State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306, 308 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding no privacy expectation in tent pitched on public land without permis-
sion); Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container
Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1476
(2010) (“The Fourth Amendment provides even less protection for the homes of the
homeless. Lower courts routinely hold that homeless persons lack a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their homes when that home is a cardboard box or some other fixture on
public property, either because the homeless person cannot claim an ownership interest in
the property or because his home is open to public view.”).
2. See infra Part I.
3. Id.
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far more than the homeless.4 Today, it may no longer hold because of
United States v. Jones,5 which was decided January of 2012 by the United
States Supreme Court. In this paper, I argue that Jones strengthens
privacy protections for the homeless by altering how we answer the
question: What is a search? Section I will describe how the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Fourth Amendment protections from gov-
ernment surveillance have been focused on the home, and thus have
been extremely limited for homeless people. Section II will introduce
the United States v. Jones decision, and will parse the reasoning of the
Court in detail. Section III will apply the reasoning of Jones to govern-
ment surveillance of homeless people, and will explore whether Jones
in fact affords the homeless a new argument for protection.
I. Privacy Protections from Government Surveillance Before
Jones
The plain language of the Fourth Amendment protects “persons,
houses, papers and effects” from unreasonable searches and seizures.6
In practice, this should mean that when the government wants to in-
vestigate someone to gather evidence of a crime, it may collect any
physical evidence or piece of information as long as it can do so with-
out doing anything illegal, like trespassing or invading someone’s pri-
vacy. If government agents want to collect more private evidence and
information, they must seek judicial oversight and approval of the
“place to be searched, and the persons and things to be seized.”7
A. What is a Search?
Because our society and the courts are uncomfortable with vague
and ambiguous distinctions like “more private,” or “unreasonable,”8
4. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 541–42 (1978) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
privacy exists only for “those wealthy enough to live exclusively in private places”); Christo-
pher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2003)
(“Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on the extent to which one can afford
accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and
vision- and sound-proof doors and walls.”).
5. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
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courts have provided numerous tests that have evolved over time to
help them answer the threshold question which begins every criminal
procedure analysis to determine whether a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion exists: What government actions, techniques and methods consti-
tute a search? Or more simply put, what is a search under the Fourth
Amendment?
1. The Rule Before 1968
When the framers enacted the Fourth Amendment, they could
not have envisioned today’s technological expansion. What early
courts recognized as a search was limited to situations where the gov-
ernment physically entered a place they had no legal right to be, or in
other words, conducted a physical trespass.9 For many years, physical
trespass was determinative of whether particular government conduct
constituted a search. The reverse was held to be true as well. When
government action fell short of a trespass, the conduct was held not to
be a Fourth Amendment search and was thus permitted without judi-
cial oversight.10 In Olmstead v. United States,11 the police listened to the
defendant’s home phone conversations from a telephone box outside
his home. The Court held that there was no search under the Fourth
Amendment because there was no trespass onto the defendant’s
property.12
2. The Rule After 1968
In 1968, Katz v. United States13 explicitly overturned Olmstead,14 al-
tering for the first time the standard for whether a search had oc-
curred. In Katz, the defendant entered a public telephone booth,
closed the door behind him, and made a telephone call.15 The gov-
ernment obtained the conversation using an electronic listening de-
vice and, as in Olmstead, never physically trespassed into the telephone
9. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (“[I]t is now incumbent upon the
defendants to show the law by which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a
trespass.”).
10. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
11. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12. Id. at 466 (finding no “actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’” and
holding “that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 353 (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no
longer be regarded as controlling.”).
15. Id. at 348–49, 352.
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booth.16 The Katz Court held that this conduct was nonetheless a
search and that the Fourth Amendment was not restricted to physical
trespass because it protected “people not places.”17 Katz established
that there could be a search under the Fourth Amendment without a
physical trespass.18
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in the Katz decision created the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether a search had
taken place.19 A “search” was defined—independent of physical tres-
pass—as government conduct that intruded into a person’s reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.20 By closing the telephone booth door in
Katz, the defendant reasonably expected his conversation to be pri-
vate. He subjectively expected his conversation to be private, and his
expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because it was one
that society was willing to recognize as reasonable.21 This two-prong,
subjective-objective test has defined the scope of government searches
since Katz, and lower courts have applied it many times in subsequent
years. Even though the reasonable expectation of privacy test purports
to take circumstances and context into account, there are many limita-
tions to its application.
B. Limitations on the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
To better understand those limitations, I will explore how each
limitation on the reasonable expectation of privacy test affects a hypo-
thetical investigation.22 Imagine a homeless man named David who
currently resides under a freeway overpass. He has made a bed out of
old blankets, treats the support beams as shelves to hold his knick-
knacks, and keeps his clothes and valuables in a closed cardboard box
and duffel bag. The police suspect him of a crime. While David is away
from his overpass, officers search through his belongings, taking evi-
16. Id. at 352–53 (“The surveillance technique they employed involved no physical
penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. . . . The fact
that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the
wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).
17. Id. at 351 (“[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given ‘area,’ viewed in the
abstract, is ‘constitutionally protected’ deflects attention from the problem presented by
this case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 361.
21. Id.
22. This example is based on the facts of State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991).
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dence that is later used to convict him. Katz says that the Fourth
Amendment protects people not places.23 Thus, even though David
doesn’t have a home or real property the way other people do, argua-
bly a reviewing court could find, under Katz, that he has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his makeshift home under the freeway. With-
out a reasonable expectation of privacy, David would not have an ac-
tionable claim under the Fourth Amendment based on the search of
his belongings.
1. The Home
Two cases following Katz made it clear that the home remains a
specially protected place.24 In Payton v. New York,25 the Court had to
determine whether an arrest warrant was required to enter a suspect’s
home to make a routine felony arrest. The Court had already decided
that a warrant-less arrest in public did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment,26 so the only issue was whether establishing probable cause
alone was sufficient to justify police entry into a home. The Court held
that a warrant was required, emphasizing the “sanctity of the home,”27
and indicating that even with probable cause, entering the home with-
out a warrant is unreasonable and thus a search under the Fourth
Amendment.28
David does not have a traditional home, as he does not reside
inside a structure, but he does consider his place under the freeway to
be his home. Is David’s subjective belief relevant? Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence seems to hold that it is not. Because David technically
lives in a public place, he is unlikely to enjoy any Fourth Amendment
protection from government arrest in his “home.”29
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
24. See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912–13 (2010) (“Homes have achieved iconic status in
the modern Fourth Amendment, with judicial rhetoric elevating residential search to the
apex of protection.”); Lee, supra note 1, at 1475 (“With privacy at the core of Fourth
Amendment protections, one’s activities in the privacy of one’s home will be more pro-
tected than one’s activities on the street. . . . [B]y focusing on privacy as the primary inter-
est protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Court favors those who already have more
privacy to begin with.”).
25. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
26. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
27. Payton, 445 U.S. at 601.
28. Id. (“[N]either history nor this Nation’s experience requires us to disregard the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions
since the origins of the Republic.”).
29. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 404 (“As a result, the police virtually never need a war-
rant to arrest . . . a homeless person.”).
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The second case, Kyllo v. U.S.,30 demonstrated that, like the pre-
Katz cases, the home is still a place protected from government sur-
veillance even when applying Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
test.31 In Kyllo, the government used a thermal imaging device to de-
tect heat radiating from the defendant’s garage in order to investigate
the defendant’s use of lamps to grow marijuana.32 The Kyllo Court
held that this was a search, even though the officers never physically
entered the home, because intimate information inside the home
needed the protection of the warrant requirement.33 The Court pos-
ited that with a heat vision sensor, the police could potentially know
when a woman inside was taking a bath or entering her sauna.34
David might not reasonably expect officers to use a thermal imag-
ing device to survey his residence, but they would not need a warrant
to do so because he does not have walls to look through. Once again,
the fact that David does not have a traditional home is significant.
Kyllo affirms Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, making it absolutely
clear that the traditional home is a specially protected place.35 Since
David lacks a traditional home, Kyllo would not protect him.
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test consists of two
parts: a person’s subjective expectation that what he is doing is pri-
vate, and an objective determination of the reasonableness of that ex-
pectation.36 If a person does not expect something to be private, or if
his expectation of privacy is unreasonable, he has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. An expectation is unreasonable when a person
constructively did not expect privacy or should not have expected pri-
vacy—this can be compared to an assumption of risk. In tort law, if
you assume the risk of taking part in a dangerous activity, you cannot
later establish that your injury was unexpected and compensable.37
Following this logic, if one assumes the risk that what he is doing will
30. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 29–30.
33. Id. at 38 (“These were intimate details because they were details of the home, just
as was the detail of how warm—or even how relatively warm—Kyllo was heating his
residence.”).
34. Id. at 38 (“The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what
hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many
would consider ‘intimate . . . .’”).
35. See id. at 40 (“That line [at the entrance of the home], we think, must be not only
firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance
that require a warrant.”).
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
(“Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that
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not be private by putting it out in public himself, then one cannot
later claim he expected it would remain private.
2. Legitimacy
Cases limiting the reasonable expectation of privacy outside the
home following the logic of an assumption of risk theory fall into
three doctrinal categories: legitimacy, open-fields, and voluntary expo-
sure.38 On an intuitive level, legitimacy is the idea that a person can-
not establish privacy in a place he was not supposed to be. The Court
has held that when a person is on property that they don’t have a legal
right to be on, they do not have the same expectation of privacy as the
owner or right-holder.39 Minnesota v. Carter40 reaffirmed the idea that
without more, being merely present on someone else’s property with
consent is not enough for a guest to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the goings-on of that house.41 The defendant in Carter, a
drug dealer, was present in the house of one of his customers with the
consent of the lessee.42 When the officers entered the house to investi-
gate a crime, the Court reasoned held it was only a search with respect
to the lessee, not the visitor.43
Because David resides on public land, he has no ownership inter-
est in the place he calls home. If he were squatting on private prop-
erty, the owner could bring an eviction suit against him.44 Under
Carter, even if he had consent to be on the property, without more he
still may not have a Fourth Amendment claim.
3. Open-Fields Doctrine
The open-fields doctrine is a subset of the plain-view doctrine,
which holds that the government may observe that which is in the
inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a
thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball.”).
38. See infra Parts I.B.2–4.
39. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 90–91.
42. See id. at 86.
43. Id. at 86–88 (The issue before the court was worded as whether the defendant had
standing to claim a Fourth Amendment violation, but is more clearly understandable as
whether the defendant could claim the same Fourth Amendment protections as the per-
son whose house he was in—the court held he could not.).
44. In an eviction suit, David’s property could be moved by the court without his
permission.
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public eye without first obtaining a warrant.45 The open-fields cases
have strengthened the idea that the Fourth Amendment protections
extend most notably to the home by holding that police may trespass
on private property without conducting a Fourth Amendment search
as long as they do not trespass in the home or surrounding curtilage.46
Even if David did in fact own the land under the freeway where he was
sleeping, because he was not sleeping inside a traditional home with
walls, a floor, and a ceiling, he would likely have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.
In Oliver v. United States,47 officers entered the defendant’s private
property, passed a gate with a no trespassing sign, and continued on
behind the defendant’s house to find illegal marijuana crops growing
in an open field, which was completely hidden from public roads by
forestation.48 The Court held that there was no search because the
Fourth Amendment protects persons, houses, papers, and effects, but
not open fields.49 The Court found “societal understanding that cer-
tain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government
invasion”50 and those areas do not include open fields on private
property. The area that deserves the most protection according to the
Oliver Court is the physical home. Reaffirming the Oliver decision, the
Court in U.S. v. Dunn51 extended Oliver’s logic to barns.52 In Dunn,
the officers entered the defendant’s property, climbed over three
fences with barbed wire, and looked inside a barn on the defendant’s
property that was not connected to his home.53 The Court found no
search, citing Oliver to once again announce that the Fourth Amend-
ment is intended to protect the intimate activities that take place in
the home. Defendant’s barn was ostensibly unsuitable for those types
of protected activities and thus there was no societal interest in pro-
tecting them.54
45. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established
that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant.”).
46. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
47. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
48. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–74.
49. Id. at 176–77.
50. Id. at 178.
51. 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
52. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294.
53. Id. at 297–98.
54. Id. at 304 (“Once at their vantage point, [the officers] merely stood, outside the
curtilage of the house and in the open fields upon which the barn was constructed, and
peered into the barn’s open front.”).
Fall 2012] THE HOME NOT THE HOMELESS 385
David’s freeway overpass is open to the public and thus legally an
open field—meaning that it lacks Fourth Amendment protection. In
both Oliver and Dunn, the defendants placed gates and no trespassing
signs in front of the searched area in an attempt to assert their expec-
tation of privacy. In both cases the Court found no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.55 What this means for David is that even if he erects a
“privacy” sign or hides his property behind a fence or gate in an at-
tempt to assert an expectation of privacy, he is unlikely to be
successful.
California v. Ciraolo56 reinforced the limit of Fourth Amendment
protection to the home. In Ciraolo, the government took pictures of
the defendant’s back yard from an airplane flying 1000 feet in the
air.57 The Court held this was not a search because the backyard was
visible from above, and the officers were not trespassing in public air-
space.58 The police had a right to be where they were and to see what
they saw, just as if the officers were walking down the street next to the
defendant’s home.59 The Court noted that the backyard was fenced
and, while technically a part of the curtilage of the home, the conduct
of the police did not amount to a search.60 David’s residence under
the freeway is not fenced or walled and was easily seen by the common
passersby so the Ciraolo Court would likely not find a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in it as well.61
4. Voluntary Exposure to the Public
Voluntary exposure is the most straightforward limitation on rea-
sonable expectations of privacy under an assumption of risk logic. In-
tuitively, if one voluntarily exposes what he is doing to the public then
55. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 170; Dunn, 480 U.S. at 294.
56. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
57. Id. at 209.
58. Id. at 213 (“The observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took
place within public navigable airspace, . . . in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this
point they were able to observe plants readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana.”).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 213 (“That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police obser-
vation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to re-
quire law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares.”).
61. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 400–01 (“Instead of declaring that one’s living space
and belongings are automatically entitled to constitutional protection—a conclusion that
would seem to follow from the Fourth Amendment’s explicit mention of ‘houses’ and ‘ef-
fects’—the Court has signaled that the reasonableness of privacy expectations in such areas
is contingent upon the existence of ‘effective’ barriers to intrusion. In other words, one’s
constitutional privacy is limited by one’s actual privacy.”).
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he cannot then claim privacy protections. Two government informant
cases, Hoffa v. United States62 and United States v. White63 provide the
basic rule that when people trust others with their secrets, they cannot
expect that whoever they told will not turn that information over to
the government.64 In Hoffa, the defendant admitted his crimes to his
close friend.65 The friend told this information to the government,
presumably to bargain for a reduced punishment for himself. The
Court held this was not a search.66 In White, the defendant also admit-
ted his crimes to a close friend. The friend was wearing a recording
device that instantly transmitted the conversation to listening of-
ficers.67 Again the Court found this not to be a search because it is
unreasonable to expect that the people we talk to will not betray our
trusts and not share our secrets with others.68 The courts have ex-
panded the voluntary exposure doctrine from government informants
to the public at large.69
In California v. Greenwood,70 the defendant took a bag of trash
outside his home and placed it on the public street for collection.71
Officers rummaged through the bag of trash and found incriminating
evidence. The Court held that there was no search because the gar-
bage was exposed to the public.72 The Court found that because any
common passerby, or even the garbage man, could have opened the
trash bag and seen what was inside, the defendant’s expectation of
privacy was not reasonable.73
62. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
63. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
64. See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 293; White, 401 U.S. at 745.
65. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 296.
66. Id. at 310–11.
67. White, 401 U.S. at 746–47.
68. Id. at 751 (“For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent
instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either
(1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his
person; (2) . . . or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversa-
tions either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the
transmitting frequency.”).
69. See Stern, supra note 24, at 923 (“Low-income individuals spend a greater share of
their time in public venues and socialize more frequently in public spaces, which typically
receive less protection under the Fourth Amendment.”).
70. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 40 (“Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the pub-
lic sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
73. Id. at 40–41 (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the
side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for
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David’s trash is in public as well as all of his other possessions
including his cardboard box, duffel bag, and bedding in that any com-
mon passerby could see them. When the defendant in Greenwood took
his closed trash bag out of his home and set it on the public street, he
immediately lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents
of the trash bag.74 David’s box and duffle bag are already in a public
place and thus the Greenwood Court would likely find he has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in their contents either.
Further limiting David’s privacy rights, United States v. Knotts75
provides that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his movements while traveling on a public road.76 In Knotts,
the government hid a beeper-tracking device in a can of chemicals
and made it available to the defendant.77 The defendant traveled
around the city on public roads with the beeper in his car. Officers
followed the defendant, and were able to remain out of sight because
they tracked the beeper electronically.78 The Court held that this was
not a search because a person driving down a public road voluntarily
exposes him or herself to the public.79 Officers could have been sta-
tioned at every intersection to observe where the defendant drove and
how long he stayed in any one place. Using the beeper was just a more
efficient acquisition of the same information and thus the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his public movements.80
the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself
have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so.”).
74. Id. (“Accordingly, having deposited their garbage in an area particularly suited for
public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express pur-
pose of having strangers take it, respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.” (internal quotations omitted)).
75. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 278.
78. Id. at 278–79.
79. Id. at 281–82 (“A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When
[the defendant] travelled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direction,
the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited
from public roads onto private property.”).
80. Id. at 282 (“Visual surveillance from public places along [the defendant]’s route
or adjoining [his] premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police.
The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the
use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the defendant]’s automobile to the police
receiver, does not alter the situation.”).
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A limitation on the Knotts rule came from United States v. Karo.81
Similar to Knotts, the defendant traveled with a can of chemicals con-
taining a beeper, but unlike in Knotts, the defendant drove to his
home and unloaded the can into his house.82 The officers were able
to tell from the beeper that the can remained in the house for a long
period of time.83 The Court held that the investigation violated the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and was a search, bas-
ing its ruling on the heightened expectation of privacy inside the
home.84
The Knotts/Karo distinction establishes that beeper surveillance is
permissible if the subject is maneuvering about public roads, but not
if the subject is in the home. Thus, if David is the target of electronic
surveillance, he would likely be without Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, even at home, as his home is on public property.
C. Privacy Outside the Home: Closed Containers
A reasonable expectation of privacy outside the home may none-
theless be found when the object of the search is a closed container.
The government cannot search inside closed containers a person
keeps with them, like luggage, without a warrant.85 Police can inspect
a closed container without a warrant in a limited way, in other words,
without opening it.86 In United States v. Place,87 the government em-
ployed drug-sniffing dogs to sniff airport luggage and bark if the dogs
detected drugs.88 The Court found this was not a search because there
81. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
82. Id. at 708–09.
83. Id. at 715 (“[H]ere, as we have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was
inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified.”).
84. Id. at 714, 716 (“This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth
Amendment . . . we think that it does. . . . Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has
been withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests
in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”); see also Stern,
supra note 24, at 913 (“The perseverance of this ‘cult of the home’ in criminal search
doctrine . . . has also justified, both politically and jurisprudentially, reducing protection in
other search contexts.”); Slobogin, supra note 4, at 401 (“As a result, people who live in
public spaces (for instance, the homeless who reside in boxes) and people who have diffi-
culty hiding or distancing their living space from casual observers (for instance, those who
live in tenements and other crowded areas) are much more likely to experience unregu-
lated government intrusions.”).
85. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
86. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
87. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
88. Id. at 699.
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was no risk of finding intrusive or personal information.89 The dogs
barked only when they detected drugs, not when they detected under-
garments or sex toys in people’s luggage. Under Place, officers are per-
mitted to walk drug-sniffing dogs around the perimeter of someone’s
house and it would still not be considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment, but in David’s case, there cannot be much distinction
between walking the drug-sniffing dog around his living area and
walking it through his bedroom.
David leaves his closed containers unattended under the freeway
and not always on his person, which by itself has some legal signifi-
cance.90 Bond v. United States91 presents a realistic analogy to some-
thing a homeless person might encounter. In Bond, the defendant
boarded a bus and stored his closed canvas bag in an overhead com-
partment. Police officers entered the bus and physically squeezed the
defendant’s bag in order to determine its contents.92 Although the
Court found that by placing the bag out of reach and away from his
person, the defendant assumed the risk that the bag would be han-
dled by other passengers or bus personnel, he did “not expect that
other passengers or bus employees [would] as a matter of course, feel
the bag in an exploratory manner.”93 The Court concluded that the
officer’s squeeze was a search under the Fourth Amendment.94
Under Bond, David arguably has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the contents of his possessions as long as he does not expect
them to be felt in an exploratory manner by other ordinary citizens.
In practice however, this rule allows the court to draw arbitrary lines
between what is protected and what is not.
In State v. Mooney,95 the Connecticut Supreme Court found a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the defendant’s closed containers,
89. Id. at 706.
90. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), in the course of searching a car with
probable cause, the officers asked all passengers to vacate the vehicle. Id. at 298. Defendant
was a passenger in the back seat and when she exited the car, she left her purse on the seat.
Id. The Court held that because the officers could legally search the car, they could also
search all closed containers inside the car. Id. at 300. Hypothetically, if the Defendant had
taken her purse with her before exiting the vehicle, the officers would not have been le-
gally able to search it because they lacked the requisite probable cause to search her per-
son. Id. at 302.
91. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
92. Id. at 336.
93. Id. at 338–39.
94. Id.
95. 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991).
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which he left under a freeway overpass.96 Our hypothetical homeless
person, David, is based on the facts of Mooney, where a homeless man
named David Mooney was living under a freeway overpass and was
suspected of a crime.97 He was arrested, and while he was in custody,
his girlfriend showed police officers where he was staying.98 The of-
ficers found the defendant’s bedding, shelves, cardboard box and duf-
fel bag, and proceeded to take them to the police station for
inventory.99 The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the defen-
dant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed duffel bag
and his closed cardboard box, but not in his bedding or his shelv-
ing.100 Ultimately, the court acquitted David Mooney because the evi-
dence needed to convict him was located in his cardboard box and
excluded at trial.
The Connecticut Supreme Court protected some of Mooney’s
possessions from unreasonable government search and seizure, but
not all of them. Obviously, the Mooney court would not have made
such distinctions between the defendant’s various possessions had the
defendant not been homeless. This holding, if it were binding prece-
dent outside of Connecticut, would leave reviewing courts to protect
closed possessions but not those considered open, a rather arbitrary
distinction.
Some scholars have argued that the closed container doctrine
has, or will soon become, obsolete.101 Justice Scalia himself has said
that closed containers outside the home should not be protected by
the Fourth Amendment.102 Whatever limited protection homeless
persons are afforded through the doctrine of closed containers “it
would be a mistake to conclude . . . that the Warrant Clause was . . .
96. Id. at 150.
97. Id. at 149–50.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 160 (“Our society has traditionally afforded a high degree of deference to
expectations of privacy in closed containers because such an area is normally intended as a
repository of personal effects.”).
101. Lee, supra note 1, at 1403 (“In the 1970s, the Court announced in a series of
cases . . . creating the Container Doctrine [that] put portable containers on an almost
equal footing with houses, which enjoy unquestioned Fourth Amendment protection; . . .
the Container Doctrine is fast becoming a historical relic.”).
102. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 585 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he
search of a closed container, outside a privately owned building, with probable cause to
believe that the container contains contraband, and when it in fact does contain contra-
band, is not one of those searches whose Fourth Amendment reasonableness depends
upon a warrant.”).
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intended to guard only against intrusions into the home.”103 The
homeless should be afforded more Fourth Amendment protection in
the places they call home.
II. United States v. Jones
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones104
could alter our understanding of what a search is, and may extend
greater Fourth Amendment protections to the homeless. In Jones, the
defendant was suspected of dealing and trafficking drugs.105 In order
to find out where he was moving his supply, the government re-
quested a warrant to attach a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) de-
vice to Jones’ wife’s car.106 The warrant was issued and valid for ten
days.107 On the eleventh day, officers attached the GPS device to the
car in a public parking lot outside the jurisdiction of the granted war-
rant.108 The warrant had both expired and was inapplicable outside
the jurisdiction, but the officers tracked the car for 28 days, 24 hours a
day, creating more than 2000 pages of data on everywhere Jones went
and how long he stayed in any one place.109 Instead of arguing good
faith reliance on a faulty warrant, the government argued that it did
not need a warrant to track Jones’ car by GPS because Jones had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical location while in pub-
lic, referencing Knotts.110 Furthermore, any data gathered while the
car was parked at Jones’ home was suppressed and thus not at issue
here.111
A. The Majority
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, which held that the
government violated Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights when agents
attached a GPS device to the car Jones drove and tracked his physical
103. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565 (1991).
104. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).




109. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947.
110. Id. at 950 (“The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no
search occurred here, since Jones had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the area of
the Jeep accessed by Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep
on the public roads, which were visible to all.”).
111. Id. at 947. The government forfeited its alternative argument—that if it was a
search it was not unreasonable—by not timely raising it. Id. at 954.
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location.112 Justice Scalia focused on physical trespass and property
rights as the basis for Fourth Amendment protection. The moment
the officers touched the car to attach the GPS device, they physically
trespassed on his personal property with the intent to obtain informa-
tion, and thus executed a search.113 In his opinion, Justice Scalia re-
counted the evolution of doctrine surrounding Fourth Amendment
searches.114 Originally physical trespass to property was required for a
search until Katz extended the definition of a search to investigations
that did not amount to a physical trespass, but instead intruded on
reasonable expectations of privacy.115 Justice Scalia clarified that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test did not withdraw the physical
trespass test, but rather added to it.116
The majority decision affirmatively avoided relying on or per-
forming the reasonable expectation of privacy test,117 and nonetheless
found a Fourth Amendment violation, highlighting that there can be
a search under the Fourth Amendment that does not amount to an
intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy.118 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, decided the matter on a narrow issue and did
not address new constitutional issues that might have extensive and
unknown ramifications, such as whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their physical location.119 The Court did not
hold that the reasonable expectation of privacy test was dead, but
112. Id. at 949.
113. See id. (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was
adopted.”).
114. Id. at 949–50.
115. Id. For more on this see supra Part I.A.
116. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”).
117. Id. at 950 (“Jones’ Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz
formulation.”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the pre-
sent case does not require us to answer that question. And answering it affirmatively leads
us needlessly into additional thorny problems. . . . What of a 2–day monitoring of a sus-
pected purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terror-
ist? We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a
classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there
is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”).
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rather suggested that it could be turned to if trespass was insufficient
to decide a case, which was not the case here.120
Justice Scalia explained the rationale behind using property
rights as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection. Even in the ab-
sence of property damage, the owner still has the legal right to keep
anyone, including the government, off his personal property.121 The
property at issue in Jones was a car parked in a public place, not real
property or land. This is significant because in a tort cause of action
for trespass to personal property—trespass to chattels—the plaintiff is
normally required to prove damages to his property.122 Jones held that
a defendant need not show damages in order to claim trespass as the
basis for a Fourth Amendment search.123 The opinion strengthened
Fourth Amendment protections of personal property outside the
home by both expanding the definition of what a search can be and
extending the real property trespass rationale to personal property
found outside the home.
B. The Concurring Opinions
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority, writing a concurring opin-
ion in which she agreed that the matter could be decided on the basis
of trespass.124 She also argued that if trespass hadn’t resolved the is-
120. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”).
121. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its close
connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred simply to ‘the right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’; the phrase ‘in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”).
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965) (“One who commits a trespass
to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispos-
sesses the other of the chattel, or (b) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or
value, or (c) the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d)
bodily harm is caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which
the possessor has a legally protected interest.”). The Restatement test clearly requires dam-
age to the chattel that was trespassed on. This can include physical damage to the chattel
itself or damage to the possessor by substantial loss of use. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (holding that because the computer server owner could not prove
damages to his server caused by the unauthorized use of another, that there was no tres-
pass to chattels action).
123. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]oday there must be ‘some
actual damage to the chattel before the action can be maintained.’ Here, there was no
actual damage to the vehicle to which the GPS device was attached.” (quotation omitted)).
124. Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The Government usurped Jones’
property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy in-
terests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection. . . .
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sue, then the reasonable expectation of privacy test would have found
a Fourth Amendment violation.125
Justice Alito wrote another concurring opinion, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, which similarly found that Jones’
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the government
tracked the car by GPS.126 However, Justice Alito’s concurrence did
not support Justice Scalia’s trespass test, and instead focused on the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, finding a search based on the
prolonged and intrusive nature of the investigation for a crime not
serious enough to warrant the intrusion.127
III. Privacy Protections from Government Surveillance after
Jones
As a new decision, Jones has not been revisited or applied in many
cases. Jones might ultimately be limited to its facts. However, Jones
could become a pro-privacy case that extends reasonable expectations
of privacy far beyond the home to cover activities performed in public.
In fact, it may extend Fourth Amendment protection to personal
property outside the home that is not otherwise subject to reasonable
expectations of privacy.
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Outside the Home
Prior to Jones, the reasonable expectation of privacy test was se-
verely limited in scope, as discussed, to protect activities inside the
home.128 Courts have been generally skeptical of a person’s reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in public, if for no other reason than the
fact that the activities occurred in public. Now, under Justice Alito’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, a person’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy might be extended to activities performed in pub-
lic. If the government collects information for a prolonged period of
Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish,
the common-law trespassory test that preceded it.”).
125. Id. at 954 (“Of course, the Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with trespas-
sory intrusions on property.”).
126. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Under this approach, relatively short-term mon-
itoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that
our society has recognized as reasonable. False But the use of longer term GPS monitoring
in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
127. Id. (“For such offenses, society’s expectation has been that law enforcement
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly moni-
tor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
128. See supra Part I.
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time, which in turn reveals a great deal of private information, then
the government has likely intruded on a person’s reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in public.
Although Justice Alito’s opinion was a concurrence, his words
should be taken seriously because Justice Sotomayor agreed with Al-
ito’s findings in her concurrence,129 which means that at least five jus-
tices have expressed the desire to extend and strengthen the
reasonable expectation of privacy test.130
While Alito’s concurrence would strengthen protections from
prolonged government surveillance, in some cases its effects may be
quite limited. The Jones prolonged surveillance rule would be inappli-
cable to the more common situations faced by the homeless because
when the court applies the reasonable expectation of privacy test it
must, as discussed above, include all its limitations.
B. Trespass to Personal Property
Under Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
however, the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis may not be
necessary. First the Court asks whether there was a physical trespass to
personal property.131 Because Justice Scalia found a Fourth Amend-
ment search based in trespass that did not amount to an intrusion into
a reasonable expectation of privacy, he clarified for us that they are
independent parts of the search inquiry.132 If David can show that his
belongings under the freeway belong to him, then even if he does not
have a reasonable expectation that they will remain private, it will still
be a search when the officers take his property and look through it.
There are two limitations to the trespass-based search that imme-
diately come to mind. First, whether the law recognizes the property
interests of the person being searched, and second, under what cir-
cumstances the new search inquiry should come into play. Since the
new search inquiry would be based in trespass and trespass is a prop-
erty concept, the same limitations that apply to property rights would
also apply to the new search inquiry. For homeless people, legally rec-
129. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice [Alito]
that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses im-
pinges on expectations of privacy.’”).
130. Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan all signed Alito’s concurrence and Jus-
tice Sotomayor supported his conclusions in her own concurrence. Id.
131. Id. at 955 (“[T]he trespassory test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an
irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades personal
property to gather information, a search occurs.”).
132. Id. at 950.
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ognized property rights can be complicated. When a homeless per-
son’s property is in his hands or immediate control, it is clear to the
rest of the world that he has a property interest in it, but when he
leaves his property behind in a place where others can find it, courts
might determine he has abandoned his property and thus relin-
quished any property interest.133 However, some courts have required
that officers recognize the difference between abandoned property
and unattended property.134 This distinction is vital to not only home-
less people’s privacy, but also to their ability to live autonomously be-
cause, “the loss of items such as clothes and medicine affects the
health and safety of homeless persons; the prospect of such losses may
discourage the homeless from leaving parks and other areas to seek
work or medical care.”135 This ultimately means that officers will need
to be trusted to fairly distinguish between unattended property and
abandoned property, something courts have trusted them to do
before.136
133. See United States v. Landry, 154 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that walk-
ing fifty feet away from property was sufficient to be abandonment, regardless of intent).
134. Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 672 n.264 (1992)
(“Officials may justify sweeps of unattended property of homeless individuals on the pre-
mise that the property seized is abandoned property. [H]owever, [the court] found a dis-
tinction between possessions of the homeless left unattended and abandoned property.
The court required local officials to acknowledge and respect that distinction.”); see also
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (finding that “by its
appearance, the property belonging to homeless persons is reasonably distinguishable
from truly abandoned property . . . and a homeless person’s personal property is generally
all he owns; therefore, while it may look like ‘junk’ to some people, its value should not be
discounted.”).
135. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559 (“Carter, one of the named plaintiffs in this case,
testified at trial that after being arrested for sleeping in Bicentennial Park, he returned to
the park to find that all of his personal possessions were gone and that it took him three
weeks to reassemble his personal papers. This loss affected his ability to obtain work be-
cause many prospective employers required identification. As a result, Carter, who now has
a job and a place to live, remained on the street just that much longer.”); see also Justin
Stecal, Search and Seizure Laws Strip Personhood from the Homeless, 53 FED. LAW. 53, 53 (2006)
(“Current search and seizure laws do not protect us all equally. . . . ‘No one is free to
perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform.’” (quoting Jeremy
Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 296 (1991))).
136. Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1559 (“(1) property belonging to homeless individuals is
typically found in areas where they congregate or reside; (2) such property is reasonably
identifiable by its nature and organization; it typically includes bedrolls, blankets, clothing,
toiletry items, food, identification, and a means for transporting the property such as a
plastic bag, cardboard box, suitcase or shopping cart; (3) police officers and city workers
assigned to the various areas where homeless persons congregate should be well aware of
the appearance of such property; . . . (5) the homeless often arrange their belongings in
such a manner as to suggest ownership—e.g., they may lean it against a tree or other object
or cover it with a pillow or blanket.”).
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As to the second limitation, the new trespass-based search inquiry
should be triggered when the government takes, touches, or uses
someone’s property as part of an investigation for the purpose of col-
lecting evidence or information.137 The situation in which the new
search inquiry will be most important is when there is a search of
property that is neither concealed within a closed container nor
openly in plain-view.138 Consider three situations: a bloody knife in a
box, a bloody knife on top of a pile of clothes and a bloody knife
under a pile of clothes. Before Jones, when an officer opened a box to
find a bloody knife, the officer likely intruded into someone’s reason-
able expectation of privacy under the closed container holdings of
Bond and Mooney.139 Under the trespass-based search this should not
change.
Plain-view means the officer can see and identify clear evidence
of a crime without touching or altering anything. If police officers,
while on their routine safety rounds, innocently spot someone’s be-
longings and by chance see a bloody knife on top of a pile of clothes,
there would be no search.140 Before Jones, when evidence of a crime
was in plain-view, officers could take the evidence and search it with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment—this would not change.
What Jones may have changed is when the police officers, while
investigating someone, begin rummaging through his belongings and
find a bloody knife under a pile of clothes, which was not immediately
noticeable before the rummaging began. Here a trespass-based search
has taken place. The new trespass-based search from Jones should al-
137. Note two distinctions, the first between inadvertent discoveries and intentional
investigatory searches, and the second between seeing clear evidence of a crime in the
open and touching or moving property in order to see evidence of a crime. Compare Jones,
132 S. Ct at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.” (emphasis added)), with Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 768 n.38 (1994) (“Perhaps merely looking without touch-
ing is not a “seizure,” but it surely should count as a “search” for one who believes in plain
meaning . . . .”). With this distinction “[a]t times . . . the Court has played word games,
insisting that sunglass or naked-eye searches are not really searches. But if high-tech binoc-
ulars, or x-ray glasses are used, then maybe.” Amar, supra note 137, at 768.
138. Before Jones, there was no case law which found Fourth Amendment protection
for property that was not in a closed container and also not in plain-view. See supra Part I.
139. See supra Part I.
140. See Amar, supra note 137, at 768 (“Plain View Searches.—When a Secret Service
agent at a presidential event stands next to her boss, wearing sunglasses and scanning the
crowd in search of any small signal that something might be amiss, she is searching without
a warrant. Yet surely this must be constitutional, and the Supreme Court has so sug-
gested.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established that
under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant.”).
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low the homeless to claim privacy protections not just for closed con-
tainers, but also for other personal property.
Conclusion
The Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, papers and
effects,”141 but it does not protect them all to the same degree. The
home has historically received the most Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.142 A person can be “stopped and frisked,” with less than proba-
ble cause, and an arrest in public can be made without a warrant.143
Papers and effects are both listed in the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but outside the home, have historically been searchable without
a finding of probable cause unless they meet legal criteria like “closed
containers.”144 Homeless people do not live in homes, but should not
be denied the same protections under the Fourth Amendment. The
recent Jones decision redresses the inequality somewhat by finding
Fourth Amendment protections outside the home based on trespass.
In addition, the search in Jones did not rely on whether Jones had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and thus was not limited by the
mere fact that it occurred in public. It is unclear how Jones will be
extended or applied in the future, but arguably, within the logic of
Jones, the homeless will be able to claim Fourth Amendment protec-
tions outside a home that they could not claim before.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142. See discussion supra Part I.
143. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
144. See discussion supra Part I.
